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ABSTRACT
Prior work on neural network verification has focused on specifications that are
linear functions of the output of the network, e.g., invariance of the classifier out-
put under adversarial perturbations of the input. In this paper, we extend verifica-
tion algorithms to be able to certify richer properties of neural networks. To do this
we introduce the class of convex-relaxable specifications, which constitute nonlin-
ear specifications that can be verified using a convex relaxation. We show that a
number of important properties of interest can be modeled within this class, in-
cluding conservation of energy in a learned dynamics model of a physical system;
semantic consistency of a classifier’s output labels under adversarial perturbations
and bounding errors in a system that predicts the summation of handwritten dig-
its. Our experimental evaluation shows that our method is able to effectively verify
these specifications. Moreover, our evaluation exposes the failure modes in mod-
els which cannot be verified to satisfy these specifications. Thus, emphasizing the
importance of training models not just to fit training data but also to be consistent
with specifications.
1 INTRODUCTION
Deep learning has been shown to be effective for problems in a wide variety of different fields
from computer vision to machine translation (see Goodfellow et al. (2016); Sutskever et al. (2014);
Krizhevsky et al. (2012)). However, due to the black-box nature of deep neural networks, they are
susceptible to undesirable behaviors that are difficult to diagnose. An instance of this was demon-
strated by Szegedy et al. (2013), who showed that neural networks for image classification produced
incorrect results on inputs which were modified by small, but carefully chosen, perturbations (known
as adversarial perturbations). This has motivated a flurry of research activity on designing both
stronger attack and defense methods for neural networks (Goodfellow et al., 2014; Carlini & Wag-
ner, 2017b; Papernot et al., 2016; Kurakin et al., 2016; Athalye et al., 2018; Moosavi-Dezfooli et al.,
2016; Madry et al., 2017). However, it has been observed by Carlini & Wagner (2017b) and Uesato
et al. (2018) that measuring robustness of networks accurately requires careful design of strong at-
tacks, which is a difficult task in general; failure to do so can result in dangerous underestimation of
network vulnerabilities.
This has driven the need for formal verification: a provable guarantee that neural networks are
consistent with a specification for all possible inputs to the network. Remarkable progress has been
made on the verification of neural networks (Tjeng & Tedrake, 2017; Cheng et al., 2017; Huang
et al., 2017; Ehlers, 2017; Katz et al., 2017; Bunel et al., 2017; Weng et al., 2018; Gehr et al., 2018;
Wong & Kolter, 2018; Dvijotham et al., 2018b). However, verification has remained mainly limited
∗equal contribution
1
ar
X
iv
:1
90
2.
09
59
2v
1 
 [c
s.L
G]
  2
5 F
eb
 20
19
Published as a conference paper at ICLR 2019
to the class of invariance specifications, which require that the output of the network is invariant to
a class of transformations, e.g., norm-bounded perturbations of the input.
There are many specifications of interest beyond invariance specifications. Predictions of ML mod-
els are mostly used not in a standalone manner but as part of a larger pipeline. For example, in an
ML based vision system supporting a self-driving car, the predictions of the ML model are fed into
the controller that drives the car. In this context, what matters is not the immediate prediction errors
of the model, but rather the consequences of incorrect predictions on the final driving behavior pro-
duced. More concretely, it may be acceptable if the vision system mistakes a dog for a cat, but not
if it mistakes a tree for another car. More generally, specifications that depend on the semantics of
the labels are required to capture the true constraint that needs to be imposed.
Our Contributions. Invariance specifications are typically stated as linear constraints on the out-
puts produced by the network. For example, the property that the difference between the logit for the
true label and any incorrect label is larger than zero. In order to support more complex specifications
like the ones that capture label semantics, it is necessary to have verification algorithms that support
nonlinear functions of the inputs and outputs. In this paper, we extend neural network verification
algorithms to handle a broader class of convex-relaxable specifications. We demonstrate that, for this
broader class of specifications verification can be done by solving a convex optimization problem.
The three example specifications that we study in this paper are: a) Physics specifications: Learned
models of physical systems should be consistent with the laws of physics (e.g., conservation of en-
ergy), b) Downstream task specifications: A system that uses image classifiers on handwritten digits
to predict the sum of these digits should make only small errors on the final sum under adversarial
perturbations of the input and c) Semantic specifications: The expected semantic change between
the label predicted by a neural network and that of the true label should be small under adversarial
perturbations of the input. Finally, we show the effectiveness of our approach in verifying these
novel specifications and their application as a diagnostic tool for investigating failure modes of ML
models.
Related work. Verification of neural networks has received significant attention in both the formal
verification and machine learning communities recently. The approaches developed can be broadly
classified into complete and incomplete verification. Complete verification approaches are guaran-
teed to either find a proof that the specification is true or find a counterexample proving that the
specification is untrue. However, they may require exhaustive search in the worst case, and have
not been successfully scaled to networks with more than a few thousand parameters to-date. Fur-
thermore, these exhaustive approaches have only been applied to networks with piecewise linear
activation functions. Examples of complete verification approaches include those based on Satisfia-
bility Modulo Theory (SMT) solvers (Huang et al., 2017; Ehlers, 2017; Katz et al., 2017) and those
based on mixed-integer programming (Bunel et al., 2017; Tjeng & Tedrake, 2017; Cheng et al.,
2017). Incomplete verification algorithms, on the other hand, may not find a proof even if the spec-
ification is true. However, if they do a find a proof, the specification is guaranteed to be true. These
algorithms are significantly more scalable thus can be applied to networks with several hundred
thousand parameters. Moreover, they have been extended to apply to arbitrary feedforward neural
networks and most commonly used activation functions (sigmoid, tanh, relu, maxpool, resnets, con-
volutions, etc.). Incomplete verification algorithms include those based on propagating bounds on
activation functions (Weng et al., 2018; Mirman et al., 2018a) and convex optimization (Dvijotham
et al., 2018b). By making verification both scalable to larger models and more efficient – these
approaches have enabled verification to be folded into training so that networks can be trained to
be provably consistent with specifications like adversarial robustness (Mirman et al., 2018b; Wong
et al., 2018; Raghunathan et al., 2018).
Organization of the Paper In Section 2 we give examples of different non-linear specifications
which neural networks should satisfy, in Section 3 we formalize our approach and use it to show
how the non-linear specifications in Section 2 can be verified. Finally, in Section 4 we demonstrate
experimental results.
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2 SPECIFICATIONS BEYOND ROBUSTNESS
In this section, we present several examples of verification of neural networks beyond the usual case
of robustness under adversarial perturbations of the input – all of which are non-linear specifications.
There has been research done on relaxations of non-linear activation functions including ReLU
(Wong & Kolter, 2018; Dvijotham et al., 2018a; Weng et al., 2018; Mirman et al., 2018a), sigmoid,
tanh and other arbitrary activation functions (Dvijotham et al., 2018b; Huang et al., 2017). How-
ever, there is a distinction between relaxing non-linear activations vs non-linear specifications. The
former assumes that the relaxations are done on each neuron independently, whereas in non-linear
specifications the relaxations will involve interactions across neurons within the neural network such
as the softmax function.
Prior verification algorithms that focus on adversarial robustness are unable to handle such nonlin-
earities, motivating the need for the new algorithms developed in this paper.
Specifications derived from label semantics: Supervised learning problems often have semantic
structure in the labels. For example, the CIFAR-100 dataset, a standard benchmark for evaluat-
ing image classification, has a hierarchical organization of labels, e.g., the categories ‘hamster’ and
‘mouse’ belong to the super-category ‘small mammals’. In many real world applications, mis-
classification within the same super-category is more acceptable than across super-categories. We
formalize this idea by using a distance function on labels d(i, j) – e.g., defined via the above men-
tioned hierarchy – and require the probability of a classifier making a ‘large distance’ mistake to be
small. Formally, if we consider an input example x with true label i, the expected semantic distance
can be defined as E [d(i, j)] =
∑
j d(i, j)P (j|x), where P (j|x) is the probability that the classifier
assigns label j to input x, and we assume that d(i, i) = 0. We can write down the specification that
the expected distance is not greater than a threshold  as
E [d(i, j)] ≤ . (1)
Here, we consider neural network classifiers where P (j|x) is the softmax over the logits produced
by the network. We note that this is a non-separable nonlinear function of the logits.
Specifications derived from physics: An interesting example of verification appears when em-
ploying ML models to simulate physical systems (see Stewart & Ermon (2017); Ehrhardt et al.
(2017); Bar-Sinai et al. (2018)). In this context, it may be important to verify that the learned dy-
namic models are consistent with the laws of physics. For example, consider a simple pendulum
with damping, which is a dissipative physical system that loses energy. The state of the system is
given by (w, h, ω) where w and h represent the horizontal and vertical coordinates of the pendulum
respectively, and ω refers to the angular velocity. For a pendulum of length l and mass m the energy
of the system is given by
E (w, h, ω) = mgh︸︷︷︸
potential
+
1
2
ml2ω2︸ ︷︷ ︸
kinetic
, (2)
here g is the gravitational acceleration constant. Suppose we train a neural network, denoted f ,
to model the next-state of the system given the current state: (w′, h′, ω′) = f (w, h, ω), where
(x′, h′, ω′) represents the state at the next time step (assuming discretized time). For this dissipative
physical system the inequality
E (w′, h′, ω′) ≤ E (w, h, ω) (3)
should be true for all input states {w, h, ω}. We note, this requires our verification algorithm to
handle quadratic specifications.
Specifications derived from downstream tasks: Machine learning models are commonly used
as a component in a pipeline where its prediction is needed for a downstream task. Consider an
accounting system that uses a computer vision model to read handwritten transactions and subse-
quently adds up the predicted amounts to obtain the total money inflow/outflow. In this system, the
ultimate quantity of interest is the summation of digits - even if the intermediate predictions are
incorrect, the system cares about the errors accumulated in the final sum. Formally, given a set of
3
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handwritten transactions {xn}Nn=1 and corresponding true transaction values {in}Nn=1, the expected
error is
Ej
[∣∣ N∑
n=1
(jn − in)
∣∣] = ∑
j∈JN
∣∣ N∑
n=1
(jn − in)
∣∣ N∏
n=1
P (jn|xn) , (4)
where J is the set of possible output labels. We would like to verify that the expected error accumu-
lated for the inflow should be less than some  > 0
Ej
[∣∣ N∑
n=1
(jn − in)
∣∣] ≤ . (5)
In contrast to the standard invariance specification, this specification cares about the error in the sum
of predictions from using the ML model N times.
3 FORMULATION OF NONLINEAR SPECIFICATIONS
We now formalize the problem of verifying nonlinear specifications of neural networks. Consider a
network mapping f : X → Y , with specification F : X × Y → R which is dependent on both the
network inputs x and outputs y = f(x). Given Sin ⊆ X , the set of inputs of interest, we say that
the specification F is satisfied if
F (x, y) ≤ 0 ∀x ∈ Sin, y = f(x). (6)
For example, the case of perturbations of input xnom in an l∞-norm ball uses
Sin = {x :‖ x− xnom ‖∞≤ δ}, (7)
where δ is the perturbation radius. For this kind of specification, one way to solve the verification
problem is by falsification, i.e., searching for an x that violates (6) using gradient based methods
(assuming differentiability). More concretely, we can attempt to solve the optimization problem
max
x∈Sin
F (x, f(x))
using, for example, a projected gradient method of the form
x(i+1) ← Proj
(
x(i) + ηi
dF (x, f(x))
dx
,Sin
)
, (8)
where ηi is the learning rate at time-step i and Proj denotes the Euclidean projection
Proj (x,Sin) = argmin
ζ∈Sin
‖x− ζ‖ .
If this iteration finds a point x ∈ Sin such that F (x, f(x)) > 0, then the specification is not satis-
fied by the network f . This is a well-known technique for finding adversarial examples (Carlini &
Wagner, 2017a), but we extend the use here to nonlinear specifications. Maximizing the objective
Eq. (6) for an arbitrary non-linear specification is hard. Since the objective is non-convex, gradient
based methods may fail to find the global optimum of F (x, f(x)) over x ∈ Sin. Consequently, the
specification can be perceived as satisfied even if there exists x ∈ Sin that can falsify the specifi-
cation, the repercussions of which might be severe. This calls for algorithms that can find provable
guarantees that there is no x ∈ Sin such that F (x, f(x)) > 0 - we refer to such algorithms as
verification algorithms. We note that, even when F is linear, solving the verification problem for an
arbitrary neural network f has been shown to be NP-hard (Weng et al., 2018) and hence algorithms
that exactly decide whether (6) holds are likely to be computationally intractable.
Instead, we settle for incomplete verification: i.e., scalable verification algorithms which can guar-
antee that the specification is truly satisfied. Incomplete algorithms may fail to find a proof that
the specification is satisfied even if the specification is indeed satisfied; however, in return we gain
computational tractability. In order to have tractable verification algorithms for nonlinear specifica-
tions, we define the class of convex-relaxable specifications - which we outline in detail in Section
3.2. We show that this class of specifications contains complex, nonlinear, verification problems and
can be solved via a convex optimization problem of size proportional to the size of the underlying
neural network. In later sections, we show how the specifications derived in the prior sections can
be modeled as instances of this class.
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3.1 NEURAL NETWORK
Here let x ∈ Rn, y ∈ Rm denote either a single input output pair, i.e., y = f(x) or multiple input
output pairs (for multiple inputs we apply the mapping to each input separately). For classification
problems, the outputs of the network are assumed to be the logits produced by the model (prior
to the application of a softmax). For clarity of presentation, we will assume that the network is a
feedforward network formed by K layers of the form
xk+1 = gk (Wkxk + bk) , k = 0, . . . ,K − 1
where x0 = x, xK = y, and gk is the activation function applied onto the kth layer. While our
framework can handle wider classes of feedforward networks, such as ResNets (see Wong et al.
(2018)), we assume the structure above as this can capture commonly used convolutional and fully
connected layers. Assume that the inputs to the network lie in a bounded range Sin = {x : l0 ≤
x ≤ u0}. This is true in most applications of neural networks, especially after rescaling. We further
assume that given that the input to the network is bounded by [l0, u0] we can bound the intermediate
layers of the network, where the kth hidden layer is bounded by [lk, uk]. Thus, we can bound the
outputs of our network
Sout = {y : lK ≤ y ≤ uK} . (9)
Several techniques have been proposed to find the tightest bounds for the intermediate layers such
as Wong & Kolter (2018); Bunel et al. (2017); Ehlers (2017); Dvijotham et al. (2018b). We refer to
these techniques as bound propagation techniques.
3.2 CONVEX-RELAXABLE SPECIFICATIONS
Most prior work on neural network verification has assumed specifications of the form:
F (x, y) = cT y + d ≤ 0 ∀x ∈ Sin, y = f(x) (10)
where c, d are fixed parameters that define the specification and Sin is some set. Here, we introduce
the class of convex-relaxable specifications.
Assumption 1. We assume that Sin ⊆ Rn,Sout ⊆ Rm are compact sets and that we have access to
an efficiently computable1 procedure that takes in F,Sin,Sout and produces a compact convex set
C (F,Sin,Sout) such that
T (F,Sin,Sout) := {(x, y, z) : F (x, y) = z, x ∈ Sin, y ∈ Sout} ⊆ C (F,Sin,Sout) . (11)
When the above assumption holds we shall say that the specification
F (x, y) ≤ 0 ∀x ∈ Sin, y = f(x) (12)
is convex-relaxable. Assumption 1 means we can find an efficiently computable convex relaxation
of the specification which allows us to formulate the verification as a convex optimization problem.
3.3 CONVEX OPTIMIZATION FOR VERIFICATION
We can propagate the bounds of our network layer by layer given that the inputs are bounded by
[l0, u0] thus we can construct the following optimization problem
maximize z (13)
subject to (x0, xK , z) ∈ C (F,Sin,Sout)
xk+1 ∈ Relax (gk) (Wkxk + bk, lk, uk) , k = 0, · · · ,K − 1
lk ≤ xk ≤ uk, k = 0, · · · ,K
over the variables x, x1, · · · , xk. Here, Relax(gk) represents the relaxed form of the activation
function gk. For example, in Bunel et al. (2017); Ehlers (2017) the following convex relaxation of
the ReLU(x) = max(x, 0) function for input x ∈ [l, u] was proposed:
Relax (ReLU) (x, l, u) =

x if l ≥ 0
0 if u ≤ 0{
α : α ≥ x, α ≥ 0, α ≤ uu−l (x− l)
}
otherwise.
(14)
1In all the examples in this paper, we can construct this function in time at most quadratic in n,m.
5
Published as a conference paper at ICLR 2019
For simplicity, we use gk = ReLU and the above relaxation throughout, for other activation func-
tions see Dvijotham et al. (2018b).
Lemma 3.1. Given a neural network f , input set Sin, and a convex-relaxable specification F , we
have that F (x, y) ≤ 0 for all x ∈ Sin, y = f(x) if the optimal value of (13) is smaller than 0 and
further (13) it is a convex optimization problem.
Proof. This follows from Assumption 1, for details we refer to Appendix A.
3.4 MODELING SPECIFICATIONS IN A CONVEX-RELAXABLE MANNER
Specifications involving the Softmax. The specifications on label semantics from (1) can be
modeled as linear functions of the softmax layer of the neural network: P (j|x) = eyj/∑k eyk ,
y = f(x). The semantic distance constraint (1) can then be written as∑
j
P (j|x)dj ≤ , (15)
where we use dj = d(i, j) for brevity, and di = 0. Given initial constraints on the input x (of the
form x ∈ Sin = {x : l0 ≤ x ≤ u0}), we use bound propagation techniques to obtain bounds on
Sout = {y : lK ≤ y ≤ uK} (as described in Section (Bunel et al., 2017; Dvijotham et al., 2018b)).
Thus the specification can be rephrased as
F (x, y) =
∑
j
exp (yj) (dj − ) ≤ 0 ∀x ∈ Sin, y ∈ Sout. (16)
The set C (F,Sin,Sout) can be constructed by noting that the exponential function is bounded above
by the linear interpolation between (lK , exp(lK)) and (uK , exp(uK)). This is given by
G(yi, lK , uK) =
exp(uK,i)− exp(lK,i))
uK,i − lK,i yi +
uK,i exp(lK,i)− lK,i exp(uK,i)
uK,i − lK,i .
We propose the following convex relaxation of the exp function:
Relax(exp)(y, lK , uK) = {α : exp(y) ≤ α ≤ G(y, lK , uK)} . (17)
Given the above relaxation it can be shown (refer to Appendix B), the set below satisfies (11):
Csmax (F,Sin,Sout) =
 z =
∑
j αj (dj − ) ,
(x, y, z) : ∃α s.t. α ∈ Relax(exp)(y, lK , uK)
y ∈ [lK , uK ]
 (18)
A similar procedure can be extended to the downstream specifications stated in (5).
Specifications involving quadratic functions. The energy specification (3) involves a quadratic
constraint on both inputs and outputs of the network. Here we show how general quadratic con-
straints are convex relaxable. Consider an arbitrary quadratic specification on the input and output
of the network:
F (x, y) =
[
1
x
y
]T
Q
[
1
x
y
]
≤ 0 ∀x ∈ Sin, y ∈ Sout, (19)
where Q ∈ R(1+n+m)×(1+n+m) is a fixed matrix. This can be rewritten as F (x, y) = Tr(QX)
where X = ααT , Tr(X) =
∑n
i Xii, and α
T =
[
1 xT yT
]
. Note that Xij = αiαj , and we
have bounds on x and y which implies bounds on α. We denote these bounds as li ≤ αi ≤ ui with
l0 = u0 = 1. The set {(x, y, z) : F (x, y) = z, x ∈ Sin, y ∈ Sout} can be rewritten as{
(x, y, z) : z = Tr(QX), X = ααT , l ≤ α ≤ u, αT = [1 xT yT ]} .
Further we note that along the diagonal, we have the functional form Xii = α2i . This quadratic form
is bounded above by the linear interpolation between (l, l2) and (u, u2) which is:
GQuad(α, l, u) = (l + u)α− ul.
6
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We can relax the constraint X = ααT as follows (for more details see Appendix C):
Relax (Quad) (α, l, u) =
X :
X − lαT − αlT + llT ≥ 0
X − uαT − vαT + uuT ≥ 0
X − lαT − αuT + luT ≤ 0
α2 ≤ diag(X) ≤ GQuad(α, l, u)
X − ααT  0
 (20)
where the notation A  B is used to indicate that A−B is a symmetric positive semidefinite matrix.
Given the above relaxation we can show (refer to Appendix C) that the set below satisfies (11):
Cquad (F,Sin,Sout) =
(x, y, z) : ∃X,α s.t z = Tr(QX)X ∈ Relax (Quad) (α, l, u)αT = [1 xT yT ]
 . (21)
4 EXPERIMENTS
We have proposed a novel set of specifications to be verified as well as new verification algorithms
that can verify whether these specifications are satisfied by neural networks. In order to validate
our contributions experimentally, we perform two sets of experiments: the first set of experiments
tests the ability of the convex relaxation approach we develop here to verify nonlinear specifica-
tions and the second set of experiments tests that the specifications we verify indeed provide useful
information on the ability of the ML model to solve the task of interest.
Tightness of verification: We proposed incomplete verification algorithms that can produce con-
servative results, i.e., even if the model satisfies the specification our approach may not be able to
prove it. In this set of experiments, we quantify this conservatism on each of the specifications from
Section 2. In order to do this, we compare the results from the verification algorithm with those
from the gradient based falsification algorithm (8) and other custom baselines for each specification.
We show that our verification algorithm can produce tight verification results, i.e., the fraction of in-
stances on which the verification algorithm fails to find a proof of a correctness but the falsification
algorithm cannot find a counter-example is small. In other words, empirically our strategy is able to
verify most instances for which the property to be verified actually holds.
Value of verification: In this set of experiments, we demonstrate the effectiveness of using ver-
ification as a tool to detect failure modes in neural networks when the specifications studied are
not satisfied. For each of the specifications described in Section 2, we compare two models A and
B which satisfy our specification to varying degrees (see below and Appendix D for the details).
We show that models which violate our convex-relaxed specifications more can exhibit interesting
failure modes which would otherwise be hard to detect.
4.1 EVALUATION METRICS
Ideally, we would like to verify that the specification is true for all “reasonable” inputs to the model.
However, defining this set is difficult in most applications - for example, what is a reasonable input
to a model recognizing handwritten digits? Due to the difficulty of defining this set, we settle for the
following weaker verification: the specification is true over Sin(xnom, δ) = {x :‖ x−xnom ‖∞≤ δ},
where xnom is a point in the test set. Since the test set consists of valid samples from the data gen-
erating distribution, we assume that inputs close to the test set will also constitute reasonable inputs
to the model. We then define the following metrics which are used in our experiments to gauge the
tightness and effectiveness our verification algorithm:
Verification bound: This is the fraction of test examples xnom for which the specification is prov-
ably satisfied over the set Sin(xnom, δ) using our verification algorithm.
Adversarial bound: This is the fraction of test examples xnom for which the falsification algorithm
based on (8) was not able to find a counter-example in the set Sin(xnom, δ).
The real quantity of interest is the fraction of test examples for which the specification is satisfied -
denoted as β. We would like the verification bound to be close to β. However, since β is difficult to
compute (due to the intractability of exact verification), we need a measurable proxy. To come up
7
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with such a proxy, we note that the verification bound is always lower than the adversarial bound,
as the attack algorithm would not be able to find a counter-example for any test example that is
verifiable. Formally, the following holds:
Verification bound ≤ β ≤ Adversarial bound.
Thus |Verification bound − β| ≤ Adversarial bound − Verification bound. Hence, we use the
difference between the Adversarial bound and the Verification bound to gauge the tightness of our
verification bound.
4.2 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
For each of the specifications we trained two networks (referred to as model A and B in the follow-
ing) that satisfy our specification to varying degrees. In each case model A has a higher verification
bound than model B (i.e, it is consistent with the specification over a larger fraction of the test set) –
while both networks perform similarly wrt. predictive accuracy on the test set. The experiments in
Section 4.3 only use model A while experiments in Section 4.4 uses both model A and model B. In
brief (see the Appendix D for additional details):
MNIST and CIFAR-10: For these datasets both models was trained to maximize the log likelihood
of true label predictions while being robust to adversarial examples via the method described in
(Wong & Kolter, 2018). The training for model A places a heavier loss than model B when robust-
ness measures are violated.
Mujoco: To test the energy specification, we used the Mujoco physics engine (Todorov et al., 2012)
to create a simulation of a simple pendulum with damping friction. We generate simulated trajecto-
ries using Mujoco and use these to train a one-step model of the pendulum dynamics. Model B was
trained to simply minimize `1 error of the predictions while model A was trained with an additional
penalty promoting conservation of energy.
4.3 TIGHTNESS OF VERIFICATION
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Figure 1: For three specifications, we plot the verification bound and adversarial bound as a function
of perturbation size on the input.
Semantic specifications on CIFAR-10. We study the semantic distance specification (1) in the
context of the CIFAR-10 dataset. We define the distances d(i, j) between labels as their distance
according to Wordnet (Miller, 1995) (the full distance matrix used is shown in Appendix F). We
require that the expected semantic distance from the true label under an adversarial perturbation of
the input of radius δ is smaller than  = .23. The threshold 0.23 was chosen so that subcategories of
man-made transport are semantically similar and subcategories of animals are semantically similar.
The results are shown in Fig. 1 (left). For all δ ≤ 6/255, the gap between the adversarial and
verification bound is smaller than .9%.
Errors in a system predicting sums of digits. We study a specification of the type (5) withN = 2
and  = 1. The results are shown in Figure 1 (middle). For δ ≤ 2/255, the gap between the
adversarial and verification bound is less than 1.5%. At δ = 6/255, the gap increases to about 13%.
We suspect this is because of the product of softmax probabilities, that degrades the tightness of the
8
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relaxation. Tighter relaxations that deal with products of probabilities are in interesting direction for
future work - signomial relaxations (Chandrasekaran & Shah, 2016) may be useful in this context.
Conservation of energy in a simple pendulum. We study energy conservation specification in
a damped simple pendulum, as described in (3) and learn a dynamics model xt+1 = f(xt). Since
the state xt is only three dimensional (horizontal position, vertical position and angular velocity),
it is possible to do exhaustive verification (by discretizing the state space with a very fine grid) in
this example, allowing us to create a “golden baseline”. Note that this procedure is computationally
expensive and the brute force search is over 239000 points. The results are shown in Fig. 1 (right).
At a perturbation radius up until 0.02, the exhaustive verification can prove that the specification is
not violated for 73.98% of the test data points while using our convex relaxation approach achieved
a lower bound of 70.00%. As we increase the size of perturbation up to 0.06, the gap between the
two increases to 22.05%. However, the convex relaxation runs an order of magnitude faster given
the same computational resources - this gap in computation time would increase even further as the
state dimension grows.
4.4 VALUE OF VERIFICATION
Consider the following scenario: We are given a pair of ML models for a task - model A and model
B. We do not necessarily know how they have been trained but would like to evaluate them before
deploying them. Standard evaluation in terms of predictive performance on a hold-out test set cannot
distinguish between the models. We consider using verification of a specification relevant to the task
as an additional way to evaluate these models. If model A is more verifiable (the verification bound
is higher) than the other, we hope to show that model A is better at solving the task than model
B. The following experiments demonstrate this for each of the specifications studied in this paper,
demonstrating the value of verification as a diagnostic tool for tasks with complex specifications.
4 8 12 16
t
−1.0
−0.4h
model A
model B
ground truth
Figure 2: The red dashed line displays the pendulum’s ground truth trajectory (height vs time). The
black line shows a rollout from model B, the blue line shows a rollout from model A. The more
verifiable model (model A) clearly tracks the ground truth trajectory significantly more closely.
Energy specifications and cascading errors in model dynamics: Models A and B were both
trained to learn dynamics of a simple pendulum (details in Appendix D). At δ = .06 2, the verifi-
cation bound (for the energy specification (3)) for model A is 64.16% and for model B is 34.53%.
When a model of a dynamical systems makes predictions that violate physical laws, its predictions
can have significant errors over long horizons. To evaluate long-term predictive accuracy of the
two models, we rollout of a long trajectory (200 steps) under models A, B and compare these to
the ground truth (a simulation using the actual physics engine Mujoco). The results are shown in
Fig. 2. For model A the rolled out trajectory matches the ground truth much more closely. Further,
the trajectory from model A eventually stabilizes at the vertical position (a stable equilibrium for the
pendulum) while that from model B keeps oscillating.
2which is equivalent to perturbing the angle of the pendulum by θ = 0.04 radians and the angular velocity
by 0.6m/s
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airplane ship
truck
Model A:
airplane ship
truck
Model B:
Figure 3: The projection of the decision boundaries onto a two dimensional surface formed by in-
terpolating between three images belonging to the same semantic category (vehicles) - aeroplane
(cyan), ship (green) and truck (yellow).The red/blue/black regions represent bird/cat/frog respec-
tively).
Expected semantic distance. Here, we verify models A and B with respect to the semantic spec-
ification (15) and a verification bound of 93.5% for model A and 84.3% for model B. Thus, we
expect that model B will be more susceptible to produce labels from semantically dissimilar cate-
gories than model A under small perturbations of the input. To show this, we visualize the decision
boundaries of the two models projected onto a 2-D surface created by interpolating between three
images which are in semantically similar categories (man-made transportation). Fig. 3 shows the de-
cision boundaries. Indeed, we can observe that the model with a higher verification bound displays
higher semantic consistency in the decision boundaries.
5 CONCLUSIONS
We have developed verification algorithms for a new class of convex-relaxable specifications, that
can model many specifications of interest in prediction tasks (energy conservation, semantic con-
sistency, downstream task errors). We have shown experimentally that our verification algorithms
can verify these specifications with high precision while still being tractable (requiring solution of
a convex optimization problem linear in the network size). We have shown that verifying these
specifications can indeed provide valuable diagnostic information regarding the ultimate behavior
of models in downstream prediction tasks. While further work is needed to scale these algorithms to
real applications, we have made significant initial steps in this work. Further, inspired by (Wong &
Kolter, 2018; Wong et al., 2018; Raghunathan et al., 2018), we believe that folding these verification
algorithms can help significantly in training models that are consistent with various specifications of
interest. We hope that these advances will enable the development of general purpose specification-
driven AI, where we have general purpose systems that can take specifications stated in a high level
language along with training data and produce ML models that achieve high predictive accuracy
while also being consistent with application-driven specifications. We believe that such an advance
will significantly aid and accelerate deployment of AI in applications with safety and security con-
straints.
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Figure 4: This plots the convex constraint G(y, 1,−1) (left) and the tangential constraints for an
exponential function when y ∈ [l, u] where l = −1 and u = 1.
A PROOF FOR LEMMA 3.1
This can be done by proof of contradiction. Suppose that the optimal value for C (F,Sin,Sout) is
less than zero, but there exists a point in the set
(xF , yF , zF ) ∈ T (F,Sin,Sout)
such that F (xF , yF ) > 0, then by definition (xF , yF , zF ) ∈ C (F,Sin,Sout) which gives a con-
tradiction. Further we note that the objective in (13) is linear and the constraints imposed form a
convex set thus it is a convex optimization problem.
B SOFTMAX RELAXATION
We outline in detail the convex relaxations we used for the softmax function to obtain the set
Csmax(F,Sin,Sout). Here we note that the denominator of a softmax cannot be zero as it is an
exponential function over the real line, thus the following is true:
F (x, y) =
∑
i
di
exp(yi)∑
j exp(yj)
= z ⇔
∑
i
(di − z) exp(yi) = 0.
⇒ T (F,Sin,Sout) =
{
(x, y, z) :
∑
i
(di − z) exp(yi) = 0, x ∈ Sin, lK ≤ y ≤ uK
}
.
For the relaxation of the exponential function on auxiliary variable α, we note that the convex con-
straint is the linear interpolation between (lK,i, exp(lK,i)) and (uK,i, exp(uK,i)) shown in Fig. 4.
This linear interpolation is given by the following:
G(yi, lK , uK) =
exp(uK,i)− exp(lK,i))
uK,i − lK,i yi +
uK,i exp(lK,i)− lK,i exp(uK,i)
uK,i − lK,i .
The bounds exp(yi) ≤ α ≤ GU (yi) defines a convex set on α, further we note that
exp(yi) ≤ exp(yi) ≤ GU (yi).
Thus, the following holds
T (F,Sin,Sout) ⊆ Csmax(F,Sin,Sout)
For implementation of the lower bound exp(yi) ≤ αi, we transform this bound into a set of linear
tangential constraints (shown in Fig. 4), such that it can be solved with an LP. The tangent at point
η ∈ [l, u] is given by
GL(yi, η) = exp (η) yi + (exp (η)− η exp (η))
This allows us to relax the exponential function by the following set of linear constraints:
GL(yi, η) ≤ α ≤ GU (yi) ∀η ∈ [li, ui] .
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C QUADRATIC RELAXATION
Here we outline in detail the convex relaxation of the quadratic function to obtain the set
Cquad(F,Sin,Sout). The quadratic function is of the form
F (x, y) =
(
1
x
y
)T
Q
(
1
x
y
)
.
For simplicity of notation we will use α = (1, x, y), we denote its ith element as xi. For this
particular case, the specification can be written as F (x, y) =
∑
ij Qijαiαj . Now we derive our
relaxation for the quadratic function, Relax(Quad)(α, l, u). With the constraints we place on α:
li ≤ αi ≤ ui, we can use the McCormick envelopes
(αi − lj)(αi − ui) ≤ 0
(αj − uj)(αi − li) ≤ 0
(αj − uj)(αi − ui) ≥ 0
(αj − lj)(αi − li) ≥ 0 (22)
to obtain constraints on the quadratic function. Given (22) we can relaxX = ααT with the following
set of constraints:
Xij − ljαi − uiαj + ljui ≤ 0
Xij − liαj − ujαi + liuj ≤ 0
Xij − uiαi − ujαj + uiuj ≥ 0
Xij − liαi − ljαj + lilj ≥ 0.
We can enforce extra constraints down the diagonal of the matrix X , as the diagonal is of the form
Xii = α
2
i . Since this is a convex function on the auxiliary variable αi, we can again use the convex
constraint which is the linear interpolation between points (l, l2) and (u, u2), given by:
GQuad(α, l, u) = (l + u)α− ul
Thus the following denotes a valid convex set on the diagonal of X:
α2 ≤ diag(X) ≤ GQuad(α, l, u)
Further we note that Xij is a symmetric semi-positive definite matrix, we can impose the following
constraint (see Luo et al. (2010)):
X − ααT  0.
Explicitly we enforce the constraint: (
1 αT
α X
)
 0 (23)
A thing to note is that constraints
Xij − ljαi − uiαj + ljui ≤ 0
Xij − liαj − ujαi + liuj ≤ 0,
becomes the same constraint when X − ααT  0 is enforced, since X is a symmetric matrix thus
one was dropped in (20). We note that ααT ∈ Relax(Quad)(X, l, u), therefore the following holds:
T (F,Sin,Sout) ⊆ Cquad(F,Sin,Sout)
D TRAINING DETAILS
This paper is primarily focused on new techniques for verification rather than model training. How-
ever, generally speaking, training neural networks using standard methods does not produce verifi-
able models. In fact, it has been observed that if one trains networks using standard cross entropy
loss or even using adversarial training, networks that seem robust empirically are not easily verified
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due to the incomplete nature of verification algorithms (Wong & Kolter, 2018). In Wong & Kolter
(2018); Wong et al. (2018); Gowal et al. (2018), the importance of training networks with a special
loss function that promotes verifiability was shown when attempting to obtain verifiably robust net-
works (against `∞ adversarial perturbations). Similar observations have been made in (Gehr et al.,
2018; Raghunathan et al., 2018). The specifications we study in this paper (1,3, 5) build upon the
standard adversarial robustness specification. Hence, we use the training method from Wong et al.
(2018) (which has achieved state of the art verifiable robustness against `∞ adversarial perturbations
on MNIST and CIFAR-10) to train networks for our CIFAR-10 and MNIST experiments.
Cifar 10: Model A We use a network that is verifiably robust to adversarial pertubations of size
8/255 (where 255 is the range of pixel values) on 24.61% of the test examples, with respect to the
standard specification that the output of the network should remain invariant to adversarial perturba-
tions of the input. The network consists of 4 convolutional layers and 3 linear layers in total 860000
paramters.
Cifar 10: Model B We use a network that is verifiably robust to adversarial pertubations of size
2/255 (where 255 is the range of pixel values) on 39.25% of the test examples, with respect to the
standard specification that the output of the network should remain invariant to adversarial pertur-
bations of the input. The architecture used is the same as Model A above.
Mujoco We trained a network using data collected from the Mujoco simulator (Todorov et al.,
2012), in particular, we used the pendulum swingup environment in the DM control suite (Tassa
et al., 2018). The pendulum is of length 0.5m and hangs 0.6m above ground. When the perturbation
radius is 0.01, since the pendulum is 0.5m in length, the equivalent perturbation in space is about
0.005 m in the x and y direction. The perturbation of the angular velocity is ω ± 0.1 radians per
second.
The pendulum environment was used to generate 90000 (state, next state) pairs, 27000 was set aside
as test set. For training the timestep between the state and next state pairs is chosen to be 0.1 seconds
(although the simulation is done at a higher time resolution to avoid numerical integration errors).
The pendulum models consists of two linear layers in total 120 parameters and takes
(cos(θ), sin(θ), ω/10) as input. Here θ is the angle of the pendulum and ω is the angular veloc-
ity. The data is generated such that the initial angular velocity lies between (-10, 10), by scaling
this with a factor of 10 (ω/10) we make sure (cos(θ), sin(θ), ω/10) lies in a box where each side is
bounded by [-1, 1].
Pendulum: Model A We train with an `1 loss and energy loss on the next state prediction, the
exact loss we impose this model is (we denote (wT , hT , sωT ) as ground truth state):
l(f) = ‖ f(w, h, sω)− (wT , hT , sωT ) ‖︸ ︷︷ ︸
`1 loss
+ |E(f(w, h, sω))− E((wT , hT , sωT ))|︸ ︷︷ ︸
energy difference loss
+ (24)
ReLU(E(f(w, h, sω))− E(w, h, sω))︸ ︷︷ ︸
increase in energy loss
, (25)
where s = 0.1 is a scaling parameter we use on angular velocity. E is given in (2). The loss we
calculate on the test set is of the `1 loss only and we obtain 0.072.
Pendulum: Model B We train with an `1 loss on the next state prediction
l(f) =‖ f(w, h, sω)− (wT , hT , sωT ) ‖ ,
The `1 loss on the test set is 0.054.
Digit Sum: Model A We use a network, consisting of two linear layers in total 15880 parameters.
This network is verifiably robust to adversarial pertubations of size 25/255 (where 255 is the range
of pixel values) on 68.16% of the test examples with respect to the standard specification. The
standard specification being that the output of the network should remain invariant to adversarial
perturbations of the input.
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Falsification: The falsification method (8) is susceptible to local optima. In order to make the
falsification method stronger, we use 20 random restarts to improve the chances of finding better
local optima.
E SCALING AND IMPLEMENTATION:
The scaling of our algorithm is dependent on the relaxations used. If the relaxations are a set of linear
constraints, the scaling is linear with respect to the input and output dimensions of the network, if
they are quadratic constraints they will scale quadratically.
For the Semantic Specification and Downstream Specification, the relaxations consisted of only
linear constraints thus can be solved with a linear program (LP). For these tasks, we used GLOP
as the LP solver. This solver takes on approximately 3-10 seconds per data point on our desktop
machine (with 1 GPU and 8G of memory) for the largest network size we handled which consists
of 4 convolutional layers and 3 linear layers and in total 860000 parameters. For the conservation
of energy, we used SDP constraints - this relaxation scales quadratically with respect to the input
and output dimension of the network. To solve for these set of constraints we used CVXPY, which
is much slower than GLOP, and tested on a smaller network which has two linear layers with 120
parameters.
F DISTANCES BETWEEN CIFAR-10 LABELS IN WORDNET
The synsets chosen from WordNet are: airplane.n.01, car.n.01, bird.n.01, cat.n.01, deer.n.01,
dog.n.01, frog.n.01, horse.n.01, ship.n.01, truck.n.01. The path similarity, here we denote as x,
in WordNet is between [0, 1/3], to make this into a distance measure between labels which are not
similar we chose d = 1/3− x.
automobile bird cat deer dog frog horse ship truck
airplane 0.22 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.26 0.27 0.28 0.17 0.22
automobile – 0.26 0.28 0.28 0.26 0.27 0.28 0.21 0.00
bird – 0.19 0.21 0.17 0.08 0.21 0.26 0.26
cat – 0.21 0.13 0.21 0.21 0.28 0.28
deer – 0.21 0.22 0.19 0.28 0.28
dog – 0.19 0.21 0.26 0.26
frog – 0.22 0.27 0.27
horse – 0.28 0.28
ship – 0.21
Table 1: This is the distance matrix d(y, y′) used for CIFAR-10.
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G CIFAR-10: SEMANTIC DECISION BOUNDARIES
truck
automobile
ship
Model A:
truck
automobile
ship
Model B:
Figure 5: We plot the projection of the decision boundaries onto a two dimensional surface formed
by interpolating between three images belonging to the same semantic category (vehicles) - truck
(yellow), ship (green) and automobile (dark green). cyan/blue regions represent airplane/cat.
H COMPARISON OF TIGHTNESS
For verification purposes, it is essential to find a convex set which is sufficiently tight such that the
upper bound found on F (x, y) is a close representative of maxx∈Sin F (x, f(x)). We use the differ-
ence between the verification bound and adversarial bound as a measure of how tight the verification
algorithm is. More concretely, the difference between the adversarial bound and verification bound
should decrease as the verification scheme becomes tighter. Here, we compare the tightness of two
different convex-relaxations for the physics specification on the pendulum model (Model B).
The SDP convex relaxation (the one we have shown in the main paper) uses the following relaxation
of the quadratic function:
Relax (Quad) (α, l, u) =
X :
X − lαT − αlT + llT ≥ 0
X − uαT − vαT + uuT ≥ 0
X − lαT − αuT + luT ≤ 0
α2 ≤ diag(X) ≤ GQuad(α, l, u)
X − ααT  0
 , (26)
To enforce the constraint X−ααT  0 means that the complexity of verification increases quadrat-
ically with respect to the dimension of α. Thus, we can trade complexity for a looser convex-
relaxation of the quadratic function given by following:
R̂elax (Quad) (α, l, u) =
X :
X − lαT − αlT + llT ≥ 0
X − uαT − vαT + uuT ≥ 0
X − lαT − αuT + luT ≤ 0
X − uαT − αlT + luT ≤ 0
α2 ≤ diag(X) ≤ GQuad(α, l, u)
 . (27)
Comparing both relaxations can give us a gauge of how much enforcing the SDP constraint X −
ααT  0 gives us in practise. The results are shown in Fig. 6. What we see is that enforcing the
SDP constraints at a small perturbation radius (i.e. δ ≤ 0.02), gives us a verification bound which
allows us to verify only 0.9% more test points. As the perturbation radius increases SDP constraint
allowed us to verify 4.8% more test data points than without. In this case, these results suggest that
the perturbation radius δ, which is less or equal to 0.06, is sufficiently small such that enforcing
higher order constraints makes for only slightly tighter convex-relaxations. In general it is often the
case that we can enforce the cheapest (computationally) relaxations if our input set Sin is sufficiently
small.
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Pendulum: Physics Specification
SDP constraints
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adversarial bound
Figure 6: We compared two different convex-relaxations of the physics specification. Specifically,
one which is with SDP constraints shown in Eq. (23) and one without the SDP constraint.
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Digit Sum: Downstream Specification
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Figure 7: Top left plot shows the difference between verification bound and adversarial bound with
respect toN = 2, 3 and 4, whereN is the number of digits summed (see. (4)). All other plots shows
the verification bound and the adversarial bound for N = 2, 3, 4 digits summed.
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Figure 8: On the left is a plot showing the true feasible region (T ) for x2 − y2 ≤ 4 (green) where
bx = 10 and by = 9, Sin = {x : −bx ≤ x ≤ bx} and Sout = {y : −by ≤ y ≤ by} with
its corresponding convex relaxed region C (black lined box). The plot on the right shows |C|−|T ||C| ,
where |C| represents the volume of the set, as bx increases and by = 9.
H.1 DOWNSTREAM SPECIFICATION: TIGHTNESS AS WE INCREASE DIGITS TO SUM
For the digit sum problem, we also investigated into the tightness of the verification bound with
respect to the adversarial bound as we increase the number of digits, N , which we sum over. We
used the same network (Model A) for all results. The results are shown in Fig. 7.
The nominal percentage (namely when the input set Sin consists only of the nominal test point)
which satisfies the specification decreases from to 72.6% to 53.3% as N increases from 2 to 4. At
the same time the difference (we denote as ∆) between the verification bound and adversarial bound
increases as N increases (shown in top left plot). We note that at small perturbation radius where
δ = 2/255, ∆ = 4.2%, 14.1%, 26.1% for N = 2, 3, 4 respectively. The increase in ∆ is linear
with respect to increase in N when δ is sufficiently small. At a larger perturbation radius, as the
percentage of test data points verifiable tends towards zero, the rate of increase in ∆ as N increases
slows down. Concretely, at δ = 6/255, ∆ = 19.9%, 49.7%, 51.8% for N = 2, 3, 4. Here, we note
that the increase in ∆ going from N = 3 to 4 is only 2.1%.
H.2 TIGHTNESS WITH A TOY EXAMPLE
To give intuition regarding the tightness of a convex-relaxed set, we use a toy example to illustrate.
Here we consider the true set, T (F, Sin, Sout) where Sin = {x : −bx ≤ x ≤ bx}, Sout = {y :
−by ≤ y ≤ by} and F (x, y) = x2 − y2 ≤ 4 (throughout this example we keep by = 9). We can
find its corresponding convex-relaxed set using Relax(Quad) which results in the following:
C(F, Sin, Sout) =
(x, y, z) : ∃X,Y, αx, αy s. t
z = X − Y
X ∈ Relax(Quad)(αx,−bx, bx)
Y ∈ Relax(Quad)(αy,−by, by)
αx = [1, x], αy = [1, y]
 .
The sets are depicted in Fig. 8, where we see that C is simply a box around the true set T (green).
With this toy example we can also ask the question what the difference in volume between the two
sets is, as this can give us an idea of the tightness of the convex relaxation. The difference is shown
on the right plot of Fig. 8. We can see that as we increase bx, while by = 9, the fractional difference
in volume increases linearly up to when bx is the same size as by = 9.
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MNIST: Entropy Specification
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Figure 9: This plot shows the entropy specification, (28), satisfaction for an MNIST classifier where
E = 0.1.
I ENTROPY SPECIFICATION
Another specification which we considered was the entropy specification. Lets consider the scenario,
where we would never want our network to be 100% confident about a certain image. That is to say
we would like this network to always maintain a level of entropy E. Thus for this our specification
is the following:
F (x, y) = E +
∑
i
exp(yi)∑
j exp(yj)
log
(
exp(yi)∑
j exp(yj)
)
≤ 0 (28)
We note that this specification can be rewritten as the following:
F (x, y) =
(∑
i
E exp(yi) + yi exp(yi)
)
− log
∑
j
exp(yj))
 ≤ 0.
Here the relaxations we use is constructed upon Relax(exp) and Relax(Quad). Concretely, our
relaxation is given by:
C =

(x, y, z) : ∃ α1, X, α2, Q s.t.
z = E
∑
i yi + Trace(Q[:n,n:2n])− log (
∑
i exp(yi))
Q ∈ Relax(Quad)(α2, l˜K , u˜K)
l˜K , u˜K = [lK , exp(lK)], [uK , exp(uK)]
α2 = [y,X]
X ∈ Relax(exp)(α1, lK , uK)
α1 = y

here n is the number of labels or equivalently the dimensions of the output y. We show the results
in Fig. 9. The model we have used is a MNIST classifier with two linear layers and 15880 parame-
ters. At a perturbation radius of δ = 2/255, the difference between the verification and adversarial
bound is 19.9%, as we increase this to 6 pixel perturbations, the difference between the two bounds
becomes close to 44%.
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